University of Tehran Journal of Economic Research (Tahghighat- E- Eghtesadi) 0039-8969 41 4 2006 10 23 - - 18213 FA Journal Article 1970 01 01 One way of solving welfare loss asymmetric information in insurance is to design informationally consistent contracts. When the contracts are not informationally consistent, adverse selection cause the portfolio insurance to be risky, and consequently the probability of accident and loss will be high. In this paper we investigate Iran's insurance companies, based on informaionlly consistent contracts and Jonh Raily (2001) paper. We find that there are some signals that show Iran automobile collusion contracts are not informationally consistent. JEL Classification: G 22 One way of solving welfare loss asymmetric information in insurance is to design informationally consistent contracts. When the contracts are not informationally consistent, adverse selection cause the portfolio insurance to be risky, and consequently the probability of accident and loss will be high. In this paper we investigate Iran's insurance companies, based on informaionlly consistent contracts and Jonh Raily (2001) paper. We find that there are some signals that show Iran automobile collusion contracts are not informationally consistent. JEL Classification: G 22 https://jte.ut.ac.ir/article_18213_554b09b0ab9a26915568bced0e098725.pdf