University of Tehran Journal of Economic Research (Tahghighat- E- Eghtesadi) 0039-8969 50 2 2015 06 22 Asymmetric Information in Iran’s Insurance Market: Case Study for Automobile Insurance in Iran Insurance Company Asymmetric Information in Iran’s Insurance Market: Case Study for Automobile Insurance in Iran Insurance Company 449 478 55089 10.22059/jte.2015.55089 FA Gholamreza Keshavarz Haddad Associate Professor of Economics at Sharif University of Technology Alireza Sabouniha Ph.D Student of Economics at Sharif University of Technology Journal Article 2014 05 08 Asymmetric Information in Iran’s Insurance Market: Case Study for Automobile Insurance in Iran Insurance Company<br />This research aims to test the presence of asymmetric information by using the dynamic information of automobile policyholders in the Iran Insurance Company (IIC). The Conditional Independence test is conducted by Bivariate Probit model, the dynamic properties which are presented for bonus/malus system is tsted by a Dynamic Bivariate Probit model. Making use of a sample of 86637 policyholders in IIC, Our finding confirms positive correlation between risk and coverage in Bivariate Probit Model, which supports presence of asymmetric information. Also, there is a negative correlation between claim in the periods of t and t-1 in Dynamic Bivariate Probit model, where confirms that behavior of the insurance policy holders are subject to moral hazard. Asymmetric Information in Iran’s Insurance Market: Case Study for Automobile Insurance in Iran Insurance Company<br />This research aims to test the presence of asymmetric information by using the dynamic information of automobile policyholders in the Iran Insurance Company (IIC). The Conditional Independence test is conducted by Bivariate Probit model, the dynamic properties which are presented for bonus/malus system is tsted by a Dynamic Bivariate Probit model. Making use of a sample of 86637 policyholders in IIC, Our finding confirms positive correlation between risk and coverage in Bivariate Probit Model, which supports presence of asymmetric information. Also, there is a negative correlation between claim in the periods of t and t-1 in Dynamic Bivariate Probit model, where confirms that behavior of the insurance policy holders are subject to moral hazard. https://jte.ut.ac.ir/article_55089_ec03881ed2a6fd7dbd470afbb30475b5.pdf