محاسبه مالیات بهینه تأمین اجتماعی با استفاده از مدل همپوشانی نسلی (OLG) و شبیه‌سازی اثرات آن بر منابع و مصارف تأمین اجتماعی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.

چکیده

مالیات تأمین اجتماعی، مالیاتی است که از کارفرمایان و کارمندان برای تأمین مالی برنامه تأمین اجتماعی اخذ می شود. هدف این مقاله تعیین میزان بهینه مشارکت های تامین اجتماعی به صورت نرخ مالیات بهینه تامین اجتماعی در اقتصاد ایران (با توجه به میزان نزدیک بینی افراد) است. تعیین نرخ بهینه مالیاتی، به سیاستگذاران در تامین مالی و اجرای بهتر برنامه های تامین اجتماعی کمک می کند. مدل این پژوهش، مدل همپوشانی نسلی(OLG) و روش پرداخت بیمه روش PYG می باشد. نتایج مدل نشان می دهد که نرخ بهینه مالیات تامین اجتماعی بستگی به عواملی همچون عامل تنزیل ذهنی افراد (𝜌)، درجه نزدیک بینی (m) و سهم سرمایه از تولید (α) دارد. با استفاده از داده های اقتصاد ایران، نرخ مالیات تامین اجتماعی بهینه در عامل تنزیل های متفاوت محاسبه شد و سپس نتایج شبیه سازی با نرخ موجود مقایسه گردید. نتایج شبیه سازی مدل نشان داد که نرخ مالیات بهینه با عامل تنزیل ذهنی𝜌=0.5 ، 0.34 است و این نرخ به نرخ موجود در اقتصاد ایران نیز نزدیک است. توابع واکنش آنی برای دو شوک نرخ مالیات بهینه تامین اجتماعی و مزایای تامین اجتماعی(مصارف نظام تامین اجتماعی) نشان داد که تاثیر این دو شوک بر متغیرهای تولید، پس انداز، موجودی سرمایه، مصرف دوره پیری، مصرف دوره جوانی، نرخ بهره و بدهی دولت کاملا با یکدیگر متفاوت است. همچنین شوک مثبت نرخ مالیات تامین اجتماعی بر مصارف و منابع تامین اجتماعی تاثیر مثبت دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Determining the optimal social security tax by the myopia approach and the overlap generational model (OLG) and simulating its effects on social security resources and expenses

نویسندگان [English]

  • Zeynab Ghobaee Arani
  • Majid Sameti
  • nematollah akbari
Faculty of Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Social security tax is a tax that is collected from employers and employees to finance the social security program. The purpose of this article is to determine the optimal social security tax in Iran's economy regarding to the level of myopia of people. Determining the optimal tax rate helps policy makers to better implement social security programs. To achieve this goal, are used to the overlap generation model (OLG) and PYG insurance payment method. The results of the model show that the optimal social security tax rate depends on factors such as people's mental discount rate (𝜌), degree of myopia (m) and the share of capital from production (α). Using the available data in Iran's economy, the optimal social security tax rate was calculated at different discount rates, and then the calculation results were compared with the existing rates. The results showed that the optimal tax rate is 0.34 at 𝜌=0.5, and this rate is near to the existing rate in Iran's economy. The instantaneous response functions for two shocks of the optimal tax rate of social security (representing the resources of the social security system) and social security benefits (representing the expenses of the social security system) showed that the impact of these two shocks on the variables of production, savings, capital stock, old age consumption, Youth consumption, interest rate and government debt are completely different from each other.Also, the positive shock of the social security tax rate has a positive effect on social security expenses and resources.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • social security tax
  • generation overlap model (OLG)
  • myopia
  • Social security sources and expenses
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