نویسندگان
1 دانشیار دانشکدهی اقتصاد دانشگاه تهران
2 دانشجوی دکتری اقتصاد دانشگاه تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In Iran’s system of tripartite collective bargaining, does the wage-policy maker consistently react optimally to the best move made by the exchange rate-policy maker (Nash-rule) or only to the state of economy (non-Nash rule)?. This paper not only investigates the nature of the political game (Nash rule against non-Nash rule) but also estimates some structural parameters by using 2SLS method and considers various economic scenarios for different bargaining conditions. The results indicate that the Nash-rule equilibrium is unstable and thus the non-Nash rule becomes more meaningful. Under the non-Nash rule, the simulated wage growth exhibits a counter-cyclical pattern and increases with the union of workers’ bargaining power. The government’s role appears to strike a balance between the interests of the employers’and the employees. Consistent with actual observations, the simulated exchange-rate appreciation has acted as a complement to wage growth from 1360 to 1385.
JEL: F16, C71, C72
کلیدواژهها [English]
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