In the present paper, the theoretical model of mathematical games is examined with respect to deviations which may occur in tax reports and corruptions that may be found in tax organizations.
Suppose that tax control center can employ tax inspectors of two types: "honest" or "dishonest" inspectors. In this paper, we propose a model in which the dishonest inspectors may operate in collusion with tax payers is considered. In this case, a tripartite game takes place amongst tax control center, tax payers and inspectors. Tax collector tries to find a strategy amongst possible choices in order to optimize the net income of the treasury.
The strategies of tax collector (government) and its target dependent (income function) is described, and finally the optimum (the best) strategy of the tax collector in comparison with strategies of the two sides of the game and parameters of the model are founded.
JEL Classification: cn, C7l
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