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What is the importance of free access to the instruments and mechanisms of finance, to accommodate the environment of the firm? According to Modigliani-Miller hypothesis, in the absence of transaction cost and government regulations, the firm capital structure and its method of finance is not important. That is, all necessary coordinations to finance the firm are done by price mechanism and each firm could fulfile its needs in current rate. By introducing transaction cost, however, the prediction of this hypothesis in the real world becomes irrelevant. In transaction cost economics framework, each firm, with respect to its financing needs, should arrange a financial transaction. The basic hypothesis of transaction cost economics -discriminating alignment- predicts the method of this arrangement: transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structure, which differ in their costs and competence, in a discriminating –mainly, transaction cost economizing- way. Namely, the firm will finance its needs in a way to have the minimum cost.
With accepting the point that depending on the firm’s characteristics and needs, there is one mechanism of governance with least cost, it is predictable that, in the absence of proper or efficient governance mechanism of financial transaction, the firms are led to use the more costly methods. The difference between an appropriate mechanism of financing and its alternatives is the most important cost that is borne by the firm. In fact, this constraint is one of the reasons that explain the costly nature of the efforts of the firm in obtaining new property rights and maintaining existing rights. These institutional costs reduce the competition power of the firm and, in long run, drive it out of the industry. This hypothesis is studied in 40 small manufacturing firms that are active in Iranian economic environment. For this purpose, a questionary is codified and during interview with manufacturers are fulfiled.
JEL Classification: B52, D23, K00, G21, G32, G34.