This paper aims to estimate a model of demand for health insurance and medical care in Iran in the presence of the heterogeneous and latent health status of individual; moreover it tests the asymmetry of information in the health insurance industry of Iran. Our dataset consists of whole family budget survey of 2006. The parameters of model are estimated by G.M.M method and The model used in this arthicle used the minimum assumption about the insurance refound policies, statistical distribution of individual’s latent health status, and selection of insurance type.
JEL Classification: C14, D82, I11
keshavarz, G., & Zomorrodi Anbaji, M. (2010). Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance of Iran Case Study of Medicine and Paraclinical Services. Journal of Economic Research (Tahghighat- E- Eghtesadi), 44(2), -.
MLA
gholamreza keshavarz; Mahdieh Zomorrodi Anbaji. "Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance of Iran Case Study of Medicine and Paraclinical Services". Journal of Economic Research (Tahghighat- E- Eghtesadi), 44, 2, 2010, -.
HARVARD
keshavarz, G., Zomorrodi Anbaji, M. (2010). 'Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance of Iran Case Study of Medicine and Paraclinical Services', Journal of Economic Research (Tahghighat- E- Eghtesadi), 44(2), pp. -.
VANCOUVER
keshavarz, G., Zomorrodi Anbaji, M. Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance of Iran Case Study of Medicine and Paraclinical Services. Journal of Economic Research (Tahghighat- E- Eghtesadi), 2010; 44(2): -.
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