Analysis of a planner institution to avoid time inconsistency of civil budgeting (Case Study: Isfahan Municipality)

Document Type : Research Paper



From the perspective of the public budgeting sector ,time inconsistency, is testable by significant deviation of performance(Tafrigh) budget efficiency from the approved. One way to avoid the problem of time inconsistency is to follow, the delegation approach. According to this approach, for any executive monetary or fiscal decision making and planning, an independent monetary or fiscal planning institution or sector is established, a part from the executive one. Objective evidences such as these institutions in metropolitan cities of our country, are formation of the planning deputy as a new municipal organization of the metropolitan cities such as Isfahan municipality.
In this survey, we first, estimate approved and performance budget efficiency of fourteen municipalities with central municipality of the aria of Isfahan metropolitan city from 2009 to 2012 by Parametric method of Timmer and WinQSB software. Two tailed T-test ,at 95% confidence interval and Pearson’s correlation coefficient are used for significant deviations of the approved budget efficiency from the performance by SPSS 18. Kolmogorov- Smirnov test is also used for data normality test. The results, indicate that, Isfahan deputy of planning was not able to avoid the phenomenon of time inconsistency during 2009 and 2010. But, after two years, during 2011 and 2012, delegation approach was able to avoid it


 ابراهیمی، سعید، رسول بیدرام، و مصطفی عمادزاده (1387). «بررسی کارایی بانک‌های اسلامی در کشورهای مختلف جهان (با استفاده از روش تحلیل پوششی داده‌ها)»، جستارهای اقتصادی، سال 5، شمارة 10، صفحات 115-136.
 اکبری، نعمت‌الله و نیره بصیری پارسا (1384). «اندازه‌گیری کارایی فنی فعالیت‌های عمران شهری (با استفاده از روش DEA: مورد مطالعه: استان همدان)»، پژوهش‌های اقتصادی، سال 5، شمارة 3، صفحات 133-153.
 بیدرام، رسول، سمیرا خسرویان دهکردی، و مصطفی رجبی (a1390). «برآورد کارایی فنی شهرداری‌های ایران، موردپژوهی: شهرداری‌های مرکز استان‌های کشور»، مدیریت شهری، سال 3، شمارة 28، صفحات 192-212.
 بیدرام، رسول (b1390). «بررسی زمینه‌های رانت‌جویی در ساختار بودجه‌ای شهرداری‌ها و ارتباط آن با کارایی (نمونة موردی: شهرداری‌های کلان‌شهرها)»، مدیریت شهری، صفحات 61-82.
 بهرامی، پوررنگ (1388). بودجة شهرداری‌ها و مدیریت بودجه در شهرداری‌های ایران، سازمان شهرداری‌ها و دهیاری‌های کشور، چاپ دوم، تهران، 66.
 سیاست‌های اصل 44 قانون اساسی (1384). مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام.
 قانون برنامة چهارم توسعة اقتصادی، اجتماعی، و فرهنگی جمهوری اسلامی ایران (1384).
 قانون برنامة پنجم توسعة اقتصادی، اجتماعی، و فرهنگی جمهوری اسلامی ایران (1390).
 روزبهان، محمود (1385). مبانی توسعة اقتصادی، چاپ نهم، تهران، تابان، 222.
Aghion, Ph. & J. Tirol (1997). “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations”, Chicago journal105 (1), 1-29.
Bakhshoodeh, M. & K. J. Thomson (2001(.“Input and Output Efficiency of Wheat Production, Kerman, Iran”, Agricultural Economics, 24(3), 307-313.
Battese, G. & T. j Coelli (1988). “Prediction of Firm level Technical Efficiencies with a Generalized Frontier Production Function and Panel Data”, Journal of Economics, 38(3), 387-399.
Calmfors, L. (2010). The Role of Independent Fiscal Policy Institutions, Report to the Prime Minister’s Office in Finland.
Calmfors , L., & S.W. Lewis (2011). What Should Fiscal Councils Do? CESifo Working, Paper, 3382.
Coelli, Ti, D.S., Odonell, Ch, j., B., & E. George (2005). An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, Springer, Second edition.
Costain, J. & Blas, B. (2012). The Role of Fiscal Delegation in a Monetary Union: a Survey of the Political Economy Issues, Spanish Ministry of Education for financial support under grant ECO2008-04073.
Debrun, X., Hauner, D., & M. S. Kumar (2009). “Independent Fiscal Agencies”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(1), 44‐81.
Debrun, X. (2011). Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias and Independent Fiscal Agencies, IMF Working Paper, Fiscal Affairs Department.
Diamond, D. W. (1996). “Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring: A Simple Example, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System”, Economic Quarterly, 82(3).
Hagemann, Robert. (2010). “Improving fiscal performance through fiscal councils”, OECD Economics Dept. Working Paper, No. 829.
Harris, M, & A. Ravie (1998). “Capital Budgeting and Delegation”, Journal of Financial Economics, 50(3), 259-289.
Kalirajan, K., & R. Shand (1999). “Frontier Production Functions and Technical Efficiency Measures”, Economic Surveys, 13 (2), 149-172.
Kirsanova, T, C. Leith and S.W. Lewis (2007). “Optimal Debt Policy, and an Institutional Proposal to help in its Implementation”, workshop organized by the DG Ecfin of the European.
Kumbhakar, S. C. (1994). “Efficiency Estimation in a Profit Maximizing Model Using Flexible Production Function”, Agricultural Economics, 10(2), 143-152.
Kuosmanen, T. (2006). “Stochastic Nonparametric Envelopment of Data: Combining virtues of SFA and DEA in a unified framework”, Economic research unit, MTT Agrifood research Finland, Luutnantintie 13, 41.
Kydland, F. E., & E. C. Prescott (1977). “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Journal of Political Economy, .85(3), 473–492.
Ludema, R., & A. D. Olofsgård (2008). “Delegation Versus Communication in the Organization of Government”, Journal of Public Economics, 92(1)2, 213–235.
Mankiw, G. (2003(. Principle of Macroeconomics, Third Edition, MIT.
Rogoff, K. (1985). “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1189.
Romer, D. (2012). Advanced Macroeconomics, Fourth Edition, McGraw-Hil.
Strotz, R. H. (1956). “Myopia and inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization”, The review of economic studies, 23(3), 165-180.
Svensson, L. (1997a). “Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation. Targets”, European Economic Review, 41, 1111-1146.
Svensson, l. (1997b). “Optimal Inflation Targets, .Conservative, Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts”, American Economic Review, 87, 98.114.
Timmer, C. P. (1971). “Using a Probabilistic Frontier, Production Function to Measure Technical Efficiency”, Political Economics, 76, 776-794.
Ureta, B, B. & R. E. Evenson )1994(. “Efficiency in Agricultural Production: The Case of Peasant Farmers in Eastern Paraguay”, Agricultural Economics, 10, 27- 37.
Walsh, C. (1995). “Optimal Contract for Central Banker”, American Economic review, 85(1), 150-167.
Wang, J., E. J Wailes & G. Cramer (1996). “A Shadow Price Frontier Measurement of Profit Efficiency in Chinese Agriculture”, American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 78, 146-156.