Experimental and Theoretical Study of the Effect of Property Right on Intertemporal Behavior

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD. Student of Economics , University of Mashhad

2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Mashhad

3 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Mashhad

Abstract

Empirical and experimental studies show that time preferences for long run are smaller than for short run. In the other word individuals in their intertemporal behavior are present bias. So the saving level becomes less than its optimal level. In this study, we assume that property right could eliminate deferent transaction cost between consumption and saving. We investigated our hypothesis by experimental method. In our experiment, 130 students participated and they answered the "MPL" tests in two group. The first group had not receive commitment. We gave the second group commitment about payment. And found time inconsistent behavior in both groups. The parameter of long run time preference was the same in both first and second group. But the present bias parameter was smaller for the first group. This means that those who have received commitment are less present bias in their intertemporal behavior.
JEL Classification: C91, D01, D23, D12

Keywords

References

خداپرست مشهدی، مهدی (1380). حقوق اقتصادی در قانون اساسی (رویکرد سیستمی). مجله‌ی دانش و توسعه. شماره 13. ص 61-86.
کریستینسن، لاری بی (1993). روش شناسی آزمایشی، مترجم: علی دلاوری، (1387). تهران. انتشارات رشد.
شوشا، هلن (1990). کاوش در جامعه شناسی روانی، مترجم: مرتضی کتبی، (1379). تهران. نشر نی.
نورث، داگلاس سی (1990). نهادها، تغییرات نهادی و عملکرد اقتصادی. مترجم: محمدرضا معینی، (1377). تهران. انتشارات سمت.
Alain, S. Lowenstein, G., & Shutterland, R. (2014). The behavioral economics guide. The London school of economics and political management. P101
Andreoni, J., Kuhn, M. A., & Sprenger, C. (2015). Measuring time preferences: A comparison of experimental methods. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 116, 451-464.
Anderoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002). Giving according to GARP: An Experimental Test of The Consistency of Preferences for Altruism. Journal of the econometric society: Econometrica. pp737-753
Andreoni, J., & Sprenger, C. (2012). Estimating time preferences from convex budgets. The American Economic Review, 102(7), 3333-3356.
Andreoni, J., & Sprenger, C. (2012). Risk preferences are not time preferences. The American Economic Review, 102(7), 3357-3376.
Angeletos, G. M., Laibson, D., Repetto, A., Tobacman, J., & Weinberg, S. (2001). The hyperbolic consumption model: Calibration, simulation, and empirical evaluation. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3), 47-68.
Ainslie G., & Haslam, N. (1992) Hyperbolic discounting, in Choice over time. Russell Sage Foundation . p 92-57
Bernheim D., & Rangel A. (2001) Conditioning, and the visceral brain. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. p: 61
Bisin, A., & Hyndman, K. (2014). Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment. National Bureau of Economic Research. (No. w19874). p52- 460-460
Chapman G. B. (1996). Temporal discounting and utility for health and money/ Journal of Experimental Psychology. 91-771
Fisher, I. (1930). The theory of interest. New York, 43.
Fisher, I. (1896). Appreciation and Interest - New York: Publications of the American EconomicAssociation. Macmillan.11. 23
Laibson, D. (1997) Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting .Quarterly Journal of Economics, p112
Menger, C. (1985). Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with SpecialReference to Economics - New York: New York University Press
Meier, S., & Sprenger, C. (2010). Present-biased preferences and credit card borrowing. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1), 193-210.
Mulligan R. F. (2006). Property right and time preference. Constitutional Political Economy . Constitutional Political Economy.
O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review, 103-124.
Phelps E., Pollak, R. (1968). On second-best national saving and game-equilibrium growth. Review of Economic Studies 35. 185-199
Prerna W., Padmavati M. (2013). A relook atinventors rights. Journal of Intellectual PropertyRights; 8 (2): 168-173.
Prelec D. (2004).Decreasing impatience: a criterion for non-stationary time preferenceand “Hyperbolic” discounting  Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106. 511- 532
Ramsey, F. P. (1928). A mathematical theory of saving. The economic journal, 38(152), 543-559.
Samuelson P. (1952). Probability, utility, and the independence axiom.Econometrica, 20.4 .
Strotz, R. H. (1955). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. The Review of Economic Studies, 23(3), 165-180.
Wang M., Riegery, M. O., & Hensz, T. (2011) How Time Preferences: Evidence from 45 Countries Journal of Economic Psychology, 52, 115-135
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: Taking stok, looking ahead, Journal of economics literature 38(3), 595-613
Journal of Economic Research (Tahghighat- E- Eghtesadi)
Volume 52, Issue 3 - Serial Number 120
October 2017
Pages 527-549

Files

History

  • Receive Date: 12 December 2016
  • Revise Date: 18 February 2017
  • Accept Date: 27 February 2017

Share

How to cite

Statistics