A survey of the effective factors on reputation of monetary authority of Iran

Document Type : Research Paper


Assistant Professor, University of Isfahan, Department of Administrative Science and Economics, Faculty of Economics


Reputation of a monetary’s authority, is an agents believe on his to control of deviation between targeting inflation and observed inflation. On one hand , a Monterey’s authority, can throw agent’s trust to his polices, leading to lower inflation expectations and inflation. But on the other hand, government pressure on the monetary authority to do discretionary monetary policy
( such as creation of money and loan, or government decision to deal with unemployment, or decreasing the real value of debts and compensate government budget deficits ,mostly in a rescission situation) would lead to higher deviation between targeting inflation and observed inflation.
In this survey, in order to test and analysis the reputation of the monetary’s authority, chisel-prone’ credibility and Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average(ARIMA) lin-log models of time series based on the model of Barro and Gorden (1983) have been used by using two tailed of t student, during the years of 1979 to 2009(end of forth developing plan). The results show that monetary’s authority was not reputational during second, third and fourth developing plan. Also, oil price by one lag, real GDP and unemployment by 3 lags have positive effects and discretionary monetary policy(creation of money and loan) and previous lack of reputation by two lags have negative effects on the reputation of a monetary’s authority.


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