نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه اقتصاد نظری، دانشکده اقتصاد، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
2 گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه شریف، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In economics, auctions are among the most important methods for resource allocation. If designed appropriately, they can achieve the mechanism designer’s objectives, such as efficiency in the price discovery process or revenue maximization. Currently, the Iran Mercantile Exchange (IME) is one of the country’s most significant commodity trading platforms, utilizing auction mechanisms to allocate goods among buyers. Recently, a simultaneous auction method (a type of sealed-bid auction) has been proposed for the cement sector to replace the open auction. Despite the alteration in the auction framework, its pricing rule remains unchanged and continues to follow a discriminatory pricing rule. The objective of this study is to investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory pricing rule yields higher revenues for sellers. To examine the effects of changing the auction method, this study employs an agent-based model along with auction data from October 2024. The results indicate that as the demand-to-supply ratio increases, or as competition intensifies within the auction, the revenue generated from the uniform price auction surpasses that of the discriminatory price auction.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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