طراحی مکانیزم بازار بین‌بانکی: مطالعه موردی: بازار بین‌بانکی ایران

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده اقتصاد، مدیریت و علوم اداری، دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران

چکیده

در این مطالعه، مکانیزم‌های مختلفی معرفی می‌شود که براساس آن، بانک مرکزی می‌تواند تقاضا برای نقدینگی در بازار بین‌بانکی را پیش‌بینی کند. نتایج شبیه‌سازی تسهیلات قاعده‌مند بانک مرکزی و درآمد در هریک از مکانیزم‌ها در طی دوره زمانی بیست و سوم مهر‌ماه ۱۳۹۹ تا سوم مرداد ۱۴۰۱ در اقتصاد ایران نشان می‌دهد هرچه هزینه مبادلاتی در اقتصاد بالاتر باشد، حجم معاملات در بازار بین‌بانکی کاهش می‌یابد و بیشتر بانک‌ها برای تأمین نقدینگی مورد‌ نیاز خود به تسهیلات قاعده‌‌مند روی می‌آورند. هم چنین میزان وابستگی متقابل الزامات ذخایر بین بانک‌ها، نااطمینانی بانک‌ها نسبت به الزامات ذخایر خصوصی خود و هزینه‌های معاملاتی در بازار بین بانکی، در انتخاب بهترین و کارآمدترین مکانیزم، نقش مهمی ایفا می‌کنند.
طبقهبندی JELC63، D02، D44، E44، E52، E58

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Interbank Market Mechanism Design: Case Study a Case Study of Iran's Interbank Market

نویسندگان [English]

  • Alireza Erfani
  • Azadeh Talebbeydokhti
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Administrative Sciences, University of Semnan, Semnan, Iran
چکیده [English]

In this study, we introduced various mechanisms that the central bank can use to predict the demand for liquidity in the interbank market. Simulating standing facilities and revenue in each mechanism from the 14th of October 2020 to the 25td of October 2022 in Iran showed that the higher the trading cost, the lower the volume of transactions in the interbank market, and most banks turn to standing facilities to meet their liquidity needs. The degree of interdependence of reserve requirements between banks, the uncertainty of banks regarding their private reserve requirements, and trading costs in the interbank market play a key role in choosing the best and most efficient mechanism.  
JEL Classification: C63, D02, D44, E44, E52, E58

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Central Bank
  • Interbank Market
  • Liquidity Auctions
  • Mechanism Design
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